Recent papers (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler,
& Fugelsang, 2012; Shenhav,Rand, & Greene, 2011)
have suggested that religious and paranormal beliefs are supported by “intuitive”
thought processes and that engaging in “analytical” thought processes can weaken
these beliefs, at least temporarily. These studies have fascinating implications
for the development of non-rational beliefs and suggest possibilities for
challenging such beliefs. These studies consider intuition and analytical
thought as opposed systems, and while this is frequently applicable, previous
research has found that in some people these two modes of thought co-exist to a
high degree and their combination supports supernatural
beliefs.
These studies are based on a “dual process” model of
thought that proposes the existence of two parallel information processing
modes. The first mode, sometimes called the experiential system, is intuitive,
emotional and immediate. The second mode, sometimes called the rational system,
is reflective, logical, and deliberative, and hence takes more time to process information
than the intuitive system. There are individual differences in the degree to
which people prefer to use either of these systems. Recent studies have found
that people who show a greater inclination towards the use of intuitive thinking
were more likely to endorse belief in God and the afterlife (Shenhav, et al., 2011) as well as in paranormal
phenomena, including psychic powers, witchcraft, astrology and so on (Pennycook, et al., 2012). Pennycook et al. even
classified belief in God along a spectrum from most conventional (a personal
God exists), through the less conventional (belief in an impersonal higher
power or an inactive God), and through into degrees of disbelief (agnosticism and
atheism). They found that more conventional God beliefs were associated with
more intuitive responses, whereas less conventional beliefs and disbelief were
associated with more analytical responses.
Even more intriguing
were the results of experimental interventions to manipulate intuitive versus
analytical thinking. Belief in God was strengthened by a writing intervention
designed to either increase confidence in one’s intuition or reduce confidence
in one’s rationality (Shenhav, et al., 2011). Conversely, belief in God was weakened by
decreasing confidence in intuition or increasing confidence in rationality. A series
of experiments in which rationality was primed were also found to decrease
belief in God (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). The primes used included viewing a picture of
Rodin’s “Thinker”, reading words associated with analytical thinking (think,
reason, analyze, ponder, rational), and, remarkably, reading a questionnaire in
a difficult to read font. Previous research has found that information
presented in a difficult to read font improves subsequent performance on tests
of analytical thinking. Notably, none of these interventions involved any form
of argumentation against religious belief or any mention of belief at all. People
were simply asked to perform these tasks and then they answered questions about
their beliefs.
These findings have interesting implications for attempts at
persuasion for or against religious beliefs. Encouraging people to trust their
intuitions or gut feelings in matters unrelated to religion could increase a
person’s subsequent receptivity to religious or supernatural ideas. Conversely,
encouraging intellectual discussion or even having people read unrelated
material in a hard-to-read font could elicit scepticism about such things. The studies
cited could not address how durable these effects are likely to be, so it is
possible that such interventions might have only transient effects.
The quote is attributed to Martin
Luther, 1569.
The findings of the studies do provide evidence that
religious and supernatural beliefs are associated with intuitive thinking and
that scepticism about religion is associated with analytical thinking. However,
it would be premature to conclude that such beliefs are best viewed in terms of
a dichotomy in which intuitive and analytical thinking are by nature opposed to
each other. Such a dichotomy seems to be implied by statements by Pennycook et
al. that: “initial intuitions during problem-solving often pre-empt further
analysis” (p. 336) and “An analytic cognitive style will typically involve a
broader assessment of problem elements as well as an examination and critical
evaluation of intuitions.” The task used to assess preference for intuitive or
analytical thinking actually involves asking people to solve problems where
there is an intuitively appealing but incorrect answer, so that to reach the
correct answer the person must reject their initial intuition. The nature of
the task itself therefore sets up a dichotomy in which intuition and reflection
are incompatible. This may well be applicable much of the time but there is
some intriguing evidence that the two modes of thought sometimes operate in a parallel
rather than a conflicting manner. This parallel operation has been found to
have implications of its own for supernatural beliefs.
The dual-process model originally proposed that the two modes are independent
of each other and as a result although some people habitually prefer one mode
over the other, some people actually prefer to use both, while some people have
little preference for either. One study sorted people into four clusters based
on their respective preferences for the two modes of thought and examined their
patterns of belief (Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff,
& Mischo, 1999). The cluster who had high
preferences for both intuitive and analytical thought (“complementary thinkers”)
actually had the highest rates of paranormal belief of all four clusters and
also scored higher on measures of magical thinking compared to the cluster with
high analytical and low intuitive thinking (“rational thinkers”). Wolfradt et
al. suggested that: “A simultaneous processing style leads potentially to a
disinhibition of associations which fosters irrational thinking” (p. 828).
Future research could examine what effects experimental
manipulations of analytical thinking might have on complementary thinkers, such
as religious scientists. It seems possible that in order to decrease the
religious beliefs of a complementary thinker it would be necessary not only to
strengthen their analytical thinking but to weaken their reliance on intuition.
Such research might be of particular interest for example to those who are
concerned about the increasing prominence of non-evidence based treatments such
as alternative medicine in educational institutions.
© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without
permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original
article is provided.
This article also appears on Psychology Today on
my blog Unique - Like Everybody Else.
Other posts discussing the possibilities of priming
Opening the Mind: Where Skepticism and Superstition Meet
Think Like a Man: Effects of Gender Priming on Cognition
Turning the Wheels of the MInd - Clockwise movements increase openness to experience
Other posts discussing the possibilities of priming
Opening the Mind: Where Skepticism and Superstition Meet
Think Like a Man: Effects of Gender Priming on Cognition
Turning the Wheels of the MInd - Clockwise movements increase openness to experience
References
Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2012). Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief Science, 336 (6080), 493-496 DOI: 10.1126/science.1215647
MacPherson, J. S., & Kelly, S. W. (2011).
Creativity and positive schizotypy influence the conflict between science and
religion. Personality and Individual
Differences, 50(4), 446-450. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2010.11.002
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012). Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief Cognition, 123 (3), 335-346 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003
Shenhav, A., Rand, D., & Greene, J. (2011). Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God Journal of Experimental Psychology: General DOI: 10.1037/a0025391
Wolfradt, U., Oubaid, V.,
Straube, E. R., Bischoff, N., & Mischo, J. (1999). Thinking styles,
schizotypal traits and anomalous experiences. Personality and Individual Differences, 27(5), 821-830. doi:
10.1016/s0191-8869(99)00031-8
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