Showing posts with label Civil rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Civil rights. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 3, 2014

Blasphemous art and attitudes towards censorship: Examining an apparent double standard

ResearchBlogging.org
Blasphemy is a naturally controversial subject. In modern Western countries there is a tension between the liberal democratic tradition upholding the right to freedom of expression on the one hand and the desire not to offend religious sensibilities on the other. This tension has been highlighted in a number of high profile cases in recent years involving artistic works that satirise images that are held sacred in various faiths. Threats and assaults against artists who have criticised Islam in particular have prompted debate about the limits of freedom of expression. Notable examples include but are not limited to the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the violent responses to the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons, the murder of Theo van Gogh, attacks on Swedish artist Lars Vilks, and the extraordinary worldwide response to the Innocence of Muslims video clip (which I have previously discussed). A number of recent events suggest that there appears to be a double standard operating in the Western media regarding which religions it is acceptable to offend. I find this particularly interesting considering the results of a recently published study finding that non-religious people were more likely than Christians to endorse a double standard regarding offending Muslims as opposed to Christians with blasphemous artworks. Why this would be the case is not entirely clear, although a number of possibilities deserve further exploration.

In modern art there has long been a custom of artists using shocking or disturbing images in order to provoke a response from viewers. Artworks that depict sacred religious images in profane ways seem to elicit the most controversy. Artists and their supporters defend such works on the grounds of artistic freedom, while critics complain about the offense to deeply held beliefs. A striking example is Piss Christ, a 1987 photograph by Andres Serrano depicting a crucifix immersed in what appears to be the artist’s urine, which still provokes intense criticism today. Although well received by art critics, the work has provoked death threats and physical vandalism, while the Catholic Church in Australia attempted to prevent it from being publicly exhibited in a national gallery in 1997. Artworks depicting sacred Islamic images in a profane way seem to provoke even more extreme reactions. For example, Roundabout Dog, a drawing by Lars Vilks depicting Muhammad with the body of a dog, was refused for entry in a public exhibition to which Vilks had been invited to contribute for fear of violent reprisals. These fears were well founded as following publication of the drawing in a newspaper editorial on freedom of expression and the right to ridicule religious symbols, death threats were made against the artist and the editor of the newspaper. An Islamic extremist group has even offered a bounty of $150,000 for the murder of Vilks. Lars Vilks has since continued to defend the importance of free expression, stating: “I'm actually not interested in offending the prophet. The point is actually to show that you can. There is nothing so holy you can't offend it.”

Worth dying for? Channel Four broadcast this partially censored image

The question of whether freedom of expression, including artistic expression, should be curbed in order to avoid offending religious believers provokes a wide variety of responses, and a recent incident in Britain is illustrative in this regard. A British political candidate named Maajid Nawaz became the focus of controversy in January this year after tweeting a cartoon depicting Jesus and Muhammad (from the web based series “Jesus and Mo”) – ironically to demonstrate that as a moderate tolerant Muslim he did not consider such images to be particularly blasphemous or offensive, and that the media should not bow to pressure to censor them. Predictably, he has received death threats, presumably from those with less moderate views on the subject. Additionally, a petition calling for his dismissal as a parliamentary candidate was started, although the leader of his party has supported Mr Nawaz’s right to express his views. What I found most interesting though was the way the media has chosen to report the incident. The BBC and the national press have apparently refused to show the image at the heart of this controversy at all, even though reporting news is supposed to be their job.[1] Britain’s Channel 4 decided to compromise by showing a partially censored image in which the face of Jesus remains visible but the face of Muhammad is completely obscured by a black oval. The response of one journalist, Nick Cohen, to this is that it seems that if Christians are offended by the cartoon they are expected to take it on the chin, but the network will not dare take the risk of offending Muslim extremists.

The decision by Channel 4 to engage in this partial censorship is paralleled by the results of a recently published paper (Dunkel & Hillard, 2013) that examined people’s attitudes to artworks that desecrate sacred images in Christianity and Islam respectively. One of the studies reported in the paper asked American participants to complete a questionnaire on their “Views on controversial art”. The questionnaire had two versions, so that with a simple change of wording participants could be asked about their views on art that offends either Christians or Muslims respectively. Sample items include, “Art that upsets Christians/Muslims should not be made because it is insensitive to their religion,” and for the opposite view, “People have a right to produce art that insults Christians/Muslims.” Participants were also asked their religious affiliation and their degree of acceptance of Christian beliefs. In this particular sample, participants happened to be either Christians or non-religious; no other religions were represented. One of the findings was that people with Christian beliefs were equally as willing to censor art that offended Muslims as well as art that offended Christians. Perhaps this indicates that Christians tend to feel that sacred images in general should be respected even if they derive from non-Christians religions. However, what I found more intriguing was the result for non-religious participants. These indicated that compared to Christians they were much less willing to censor art offensive to Christians, but they were equally as willing as Christians to censor art that offended Muslims. This seems like a very inconsistent stance to take and the reasons for it are not clear, although a number of explanations come to mind.

Piss Christ by Andres Serrano. Is it alright for people who are offended by images like this to try to prevent it from being exhibited? 

The authors discussed the possibility that non-Christians, who are a minority group in the USA, might have different attitudes to Christianity, the mainstream religion, compared to Islam, a minority religion. Non-religious people might be antagonistic to mainstream religion perhaps because they feel that their rights as a minority group need to be protected, and hence they wish to protect their right to criticise Christianity. On the other hand, the non-religious might feel more sympathy to society’s other religious minorities, even if they do not share their beliefs. Some tentative evidence in support of this view is indicated by the fact that some members of the political left-wing, which traditionally has a secular orientation, have allied with Islamist groups, in spite of the latter’s right-wing values, in the name of multiculturalism. (Something which is strongly criticised by other members of the left though, such as Maryam Namazie, as a step backwards.) If it is true that non-religious people tend to see Muslims as a potential political ally against mainstream Christians, then supporting censorship of anti-Muslim art for this reason might be a futile endeavour. The results of the study by Dunkel and Hillard indicate that Christians support such censorship to the same degree, so Muslims would have little to gain from an alliance with the non-religious in that respect.

Another possibility is that non-religious people are particularly responsive to intellectual fashions current in modern Western culture. There is a trend for non-religious people to be somewhat more intelligent than religious people, and it has been argued that highly intelligent people are better at detecting and espousing the values that are normative at a particular time (Woodley, 2010). Multiculturalism has become politically fashionable in Western countries in recent years and perhaps willingness to censor anti-Islamic art reflects a liberal concern to uphold respect for “cultural diversity.” Personally, I think this would also be an unfortunate stance for intelligent people to take as radical Islamists do not reciprocate the same respect and tolerance and if allowed to have their way would impose their own values on others. The study by Dunkel and Hillard did not assess participants’ political views or their attitudes towards multiculturalism, so further research measuring these would help determine if inconsistent attitudes towards censorship are related to such social and political concerns.

On the other hand, inconsistent attitudes to censorship appear to exist in countries that are much more secular than the USA, such as those in Western Europe and Australia. Even though Western European countries are generally nominally Christian, surveys have found that belief in Christianity has considerably declined in recent decades. As a result, non-religious people do not have the same kind of minority status they have in the USA. In spite of increased secularization, there has been a trend in recent years to stifle freedom of speech in order to prevent offense to religious people. There have been a number of well-publicised cases in Europe of people actually being prosecuted for criticising Islam in particular (see this site for examples). An example of a double standard protecting Islam occurred in Australia in 2013 when a student newspaper ran a series of satirical infographics criticising Catholicism, Scientology, Mormonism, Judaism, and Islam respectively. Even though the first four articles were published without any controversy, when the article satirising Islam was published the newspaper staff were forced to remove it by university administrators, who cited concerns that the piece might pose a threat to the reputation and security of the university. What these cases seem to indicate is that even in largely secular countries there appears to be an attitude that offending Muslims is much less acceptable than offending Christians.

Many people, including myself, have become concerned that an attitude of fear has become prevalent in Western countries in response to multiple violent incidents involving Muslim extremists seeking to punish anyone who dares to publish any material they deem disrespectful of Islam. An increasingly common response by secular authorities to this fear has been to placate extremists and to chastise anyone who feels bold enough to provoke them. Perhaps this has seeped into the thinking of even non-religious people who would not otherwise be inclined to grant respect to “sacred” figures in whom they do not actually believe. Hence, non-religious people might understandably feel that at the present time satirising Christianity is a safer way to express their lack of respect for religion compared to satirising Islam, which is accompanied by a much higher risk. If correct, this is a very unfortunate situation, as it sends violent religious bullies the message that standover tactics will be effective in silencing their critics. It is also an erosion of a fundamental right at the heart of Western civilisation in the name of placating people who have no respect for Western values of tolerance and freedom. Dunkel and Hillard’s study did not examine whether fear actually does play a role in the thinking of those who would support censorship, so further research would help determine if this is correct.

Another limitation of Dunkel and Hillard’s study is that it used a rather small sample of non-religious people from a single country. Larger samples drawn from other more secular countries such as those in Western Europe would help determine how broadly their results can be generalised. Additionally, “non-religious” people are not homogenous, so it would be helpful to have more fine grained information about what views these people have about religion and about art. That is, non-religious people have a wide array of attitudes towards religions, including indifference, hostility, even sympathy, and it seems likely that these different attitudes would be associated with differing views on censorship of “blasphemous” art. Many non-religious people, including famous atheists such as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, are quite outspoken about the importance of free expression and the right to criticise Islam in particular. Further research would be needed to identify what characteristics distinguish those who consistently reject all censorship from those who support a double standard.




Footnote
[1] Further examples of the BBC’s reluctance to say or do anything that might upset Muslims in any way, even if this means censoring the news, are discussed here

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© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided.   

This article also appears on Psychology Today on my blog Unique - Like Everybody Else. 

Further reading
Is Insulting Religion "Extremism"?
My views on how people choose to respond to provocative religious insults.

Pew Research report on Blasphemy, Apostasy, and Defamation of religion laws around the world.  

Criticism of blasphemy laws and support for freedom of speech:
Pair of articles by PT blogger Gad Saad:

Masturbating With a Crucifix in a Film… No Riots?


Please consider following me on Facebook, Google Plus, or Twitter.

© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided.   

This article also appears on Psychology Today on my blog Unique - Like Everybody Else.

References
Dunkel CS, & Hillard EE (2014). Blasphemy or art: what art should be censored and who wants to censor it? The Journal of psychology, 148 (1), 1-21 PMID: 24617268
Woodley, M. A. (2010). Are high-IQ individuals deficient in common sense? A critical examination of the ‘clever sillies’ hypothesis. Intelligence, 38(5), 471-480. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2010.06.002

Thursday, September 13, 2012

Extreme beliefs about "extremism": Religious incivility and the Libya riot


ResearchBlogging.org
According to some commentators, the recent riot in Libya in which an embassy was burned and four Americans killed may be viewed as an extreme response to "extremism". Huffington Post blogger Ahmed Shihab-Eldin argues that:
Were it not for YouTube, perhaps Christopher Stevens, the U.S. ambassador to Libya, would still be alive.
He was of course referring to the video by Sam Bacile in which the prophet Muhammad is insulted. He then goes on to say that, "extremism begets extremism." 

This sentiment was echoed by social psychologist Ravi Iyer, who goes on to state that, "Killing begets killing. Violence begets violence." He then goes on to compare Bacile to other "extremists":
Indeed, there is clear evidence that Sam Bacile, Terry JonesOsama Bin LadenCharles Manson, and other extremists understand this implicitly and commit their extremist acts with the idea of inciting a wider war.
The implicit assumption here is that making and posting a film intended to insult a religious group is an act of "extremism" and that this is somehow in the same class of actions as violently mobbing an embassy or carrying out acts of terror. Note that Terry Jones is classed as one of these "extremists". His terrifying act of extremism was to burn a book deemed sacred by certain people. Offensive as this might be to Muslims, I hardly think this is in any way comparable to the actions of people like Charles Manson or Osama bin Laden who were responsible for the actual killing of human beings. 

Posting an offensive video is not an act of "violence" in any sensible use of the word, and certainly not a form of killing as no-one actually died in the making of the film as far as I know. I have only watched part of the video, but to the best of my knowledge it does not advocate that anyone be killed. What justification could there be for regarding an offensive film as “extremism”?

Perhaps Iyer and Shihab-Eldin think that insulting someone else’s religion is immoral. According to Graham and Haidt (2010) traditional forms of morality regard respect for the “sacred” as a moral value in its own right, independent of other moral concerns, such as whether or not an action is harmful to others. Jonathon Haidt has written a book apparently arguing that respect for the sacred is not just a source of moral sentiments but actually remains an indispensable foundation for morality even in the post-enlightenment secular Western world. But is this really true? Beliefs about the sacred are inherently divisive as not everyone can agree on what is sacred. Hence sacred concerns cannot form a universal basis of morality. Demanding that people show respect for other people’s “sacred” beliefs presents difficulties, as this leads into the demand that some things cannot be criticised because it may offend somebody. This presents an obvious conflict with the right of freedom of speech. Freedom of speech reflects the freedom to think. Declaring some things off-limits to criticism is like demanding that people not think certain thoughts. Ronald Lindsay has pointed out that concern for the sacred has been used repeatedly to justify inequality and oppression. Furthermore, history has been filled with atrocities performed in the name of the sacred.   

Ravi Iyer does cite more pragmatic concerns, arguing that incivility is provocative and regularly leads to violence. Research does confirm that provocation is perhaps the single most important cause of aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). But does this mean that the video is to blame for the actions of people who chose to go into the streets with assault rifles with the intention of burning a building while people were inside? Where is the responsibility here? If a man comes up to me and says, "You're mother is a whore!" am I not responsible for how I choose to react? Even if the man is deliberately trying to incite me to fight, I would still be held legally responsible in a court of law if I chose to react with violence. As a human being I have a choice about how I react to provocation. In such a situation I have many choices, such as telling the man he is a stupid idiot and walking away. 

Violence does not simply follow on from provocation in the way that night follows day. There is a choice involved. Iyer cites a number of research studies to support his claim that group reactions to “conflict, extremism, violence, and incivility/demonization” are fairly predictable. Notably, Iyer lumps in ‘incivility’ with ‘demonization’ as if they are the same thing, and these are grouped with violence and extremism as if these are of comparable levels of severity. One of the studies cited discusses the role of humiliation in the Rwandan genocide. The examples of humiliation (e.g. repeated imprisonment) cited in that article are clearly more serious than the screening of an offensive film. Two of the other references deal with mortality salience (reminders of one’s own eventual death) and the relevance of this research to the present issue is unclear. Iyer also cites studies on retaliation to actual violence against one’s in-group (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006) and on social rejection (Gaertner, Iuzzini, & O’Mara, 2008). The relevance of these is also unclear as the Libya riots were not a response to actual violence or to being rejected from group membership.

Furthermore, although provocation plays an important role in eliciting aggression, research also shows that when people choose to react with violence to provocation, it is because they have a value system in which violence is an acceptable, or even expected, response (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). If someone is raised in a "culture of honour" they may believe that failure to respond to a provocation with aggression will be seen as a sign of being weak (Cohen et al., 1996). Youth gang violence, for example, has been linked to codes of honour or respect (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Most people have strong inhibitions against violence, and only become aggressive when these inhibitions are over-ridden. Moral justifications can over-ride these inhibitions. Common justifications for extreme violence involve arguments that it is for a greater good or that honour demands it (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Additionally, victims may be dehumanised, so that that they are thought to be undeserving of moral concern (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). If someone believes that an insult to their religion or holy book is equivalent to a shocking crime that must be avenged, violence is the predictable result. 


A Muslim protester in London demonstrating against Danish cartoons depicting Muhammad. (Image source.)

Imagine, John Lennon asked, a world with ‘nothing to kill or die for.’ Consider what the world might be like if people generally believed that violence was never an acceptable response to a mere insult. Would not the world be a more peaceful place? Is this too much to ask for? Ahmed Shihab-Eldin argued that it is intolerance, not Islam, that is the real cancer. But does tolerance mean that critics of religion must shut up so that some people will not be offended? What happened to tolerance of differing opinions? Any religion, or interpretation of religion if you prefer, that preaches that violence is an acceptable response to non-violent provocation is preaching intolerance. People have the right to be upset when they feel insulted. No-one has the right to go out and kill people and spread terror just because they are upset. 
Déjà vu? "Peaceful" protesters demonstrating in Sydney advocating murder. 

Iyer may actually have a good point that incivility causes divisiveness and is therefore unwise, but it is hardly morally equivalent to extremism. Blaming rudeness for resulting acts of violence absolves those who choose to engage in violent acts of moral responsibility. The world will be better off when people realise that not being offended is a preference and not a human right. Having opinions about what is “sacred” can never excuse violence.  


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© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided. 

This article also appears on Psychology Today on my blog Unique - Like Everybody Else.

References
Anderson, Craig A., & Bushman, Brad J. (2002). Human aggression Annual Review of Psychology, 53 (1), 27-51 DOI: 10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135231
Cohen D, Nisbett RE, Bowdle BF, & Schwarz N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the southern culture of honor: an "experimental ethnography" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70 (5), 945-959 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.945
Gaertner, L., Iuzzini, J., & O’Mara, E. M. (2008). When rejection by one fosters aggression against many: Multiple-victim aggression as a consequence of social rejection and perceived groupness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(4), 958-970. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2008.02.004
Graham J, & Haidt J (2010). Beyond beliefs: religions bind individuals into moral communities. Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc, 14 (1), 140-50 PMID: 20089848
Lickel, B., Miller, N., Stenstrom, D. M., Denson, T. F., & Schmader, T. (2006). Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in Intergroup Aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(4), 372-390. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_6

Further reading:
A number of well-written articles discussing free speech in relation to religion can be found hereherehere, and here. A thoughtful critique of the current push for blasphemy laws can be read here

An earlier version of this article appears on Cosmic Cogitations

Saturday, August 11, 2012

Is there something wrong with people who do not use Facebook?

Recent news stories have suggested that employers may be reluctant to hire people without a Facebook profile on the grounds that Facebook usage has become so common that not having an account is seen as somehow abnormal. This concern appears to have been compounded by a lurid report in a German newspaper that mass killers James Holmes and Anders Behring Breivik did not have Facebook accounts, leading to the rather hysterical conclusion that not having an account “could be the first sign that you are a mass murderer.”

"Hey, there's that guy with no Facebook account! He must be Jack the Ripper!"
(Image source: The Illustrated London News, 1888)

Is there any substance to these concerns? Research suggests that although not having a Facebook account might be unusual nowadays it is hardly cause for alarm. Indeed, the fact that someone has an account is hardly a credential of mental health either, and may be associated with its own problems, admittedly minor ones.

An Australian study examined personality differences between people with and without Facebook accounts (Ryan & Xenos, 2011).  People with an account were found to be more extraverted and narcissistic, whereas those without an account were found to be more conscientious and also shyer. They also found that those without an account experienced more social loneliness, but those with an account experienced more family loneliness. They also looked at time spent on Facebook per day among users and found time spent was positively correlated with neuroticism and loneliness and negatively correlated with conscientiousness. All of these effects tended to be small. These findings seem comparable to those of a study comparing users of Facebook and Twitter respectively which found that people who preferred Facebook tended to be more extraverted and sociable compared to Twitter users, but also more neurotic and less intellectually oriented (Hughes, Rowe, Batey, & Lee, 2012).

Discrimination against non-users of Facebook is not only unfair it is unwarranted.

What might this suggest to a potential employer concerned about whether an applicant has a Facebook account or not? On the one hand those who have an account will tend to be more outgoing and less shy, which would be important in jobs involving a great deal of face-to-face interaction. On the other hand, those who do not have an account tend to be higher in conscientiousness, suggesting they are more likely to be hard working, persevering and achievement oriented. In fact, conscientiousness has been found to be one of the strongest personality predictors of job performance across all professions. Furthermore, the more time a day a person spends on Facebook, the less time they are doing actual work and the more time they are likely to be whining about their personal problems. People who do not have a Facebook account also tend to be somewhat less narcissistic, that is, less egotistical and exhibitionistic. Employers concerned about someone not being on Facebook might instead want to consider the desirability of hiring applicants who think that “everything is about me” and who lack a strong work ethic. Narcissism is also a member of what personality psychologists call “the dark triad” of personality, along with such antisocial characteristics as psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006). Although there is no evidence that Facebook usage has anything at all to do either way with being a homicidal maniac, the fact that narcissism has a known relationship with antisocial traits would seem to suggest that people who do not have Facebook accounts are actually less likely to commit atrocities. All of these considerations should of course be tempered by the fact that all of the effects reported by these research studies have been small in size. So, looking at things scientifically, knowing that someone does or does not have a Facebook account is not likely to be a strong indicator of the character of the person, and is hardly concern for panic either way.    

Personally, I think a more worrying trend than people not having Facebook accounts, is revealed by cases of employers in the U.S. demanding that job applicants hand over their Facebook passwords or “friend” their bosses so that the latter can snoop on them. Perhaps, all this hysteria about some people not having accounts is really a cloak to justify an increasing invasion of privacy. Surely, trying to stigmatise or marginalise people who choose not to conform to popular social trends and demanding access to people’s private communications are hardly compatible with the values of liberal democracy.


This post also appears on my blog at Psychology Today Unique - Like Everybody Else.



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© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided.  

References
         Hughes, D. J., Rowe, M., Batey, M., & Lee, A. (2012). A tale of two sites: Twitter vs. Facebook and the personality predictors of social media usage. Computers in Human Behavior, 28 (2), 561-569 DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2011.11.001
           
          Jakobwitz, S., & Egan, V. (2006). The dark triad and normal personality traits Personality and Individual Differences, 40 (2), 331-339 DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2005.07.006
           
         Ryan, T., & Xenos, S. (2011). Who uses Facebook? An investigation into the relationship between the Big Five, shyness, narcissism, loneliness, and Facebook usage. Computers in Human Behavior, 27 (5), 1658-1664 DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2011.02.004