Showing posts with label intelligence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intelligence. Show all posts

Friday, October 25, 2013

The Complex Relationship Between Intelligence and Political Orientation

ResearchBlogging.org
Intelligence is easily one of the most controversial and divisive issues in scientific psychology. Add the issue of political ideology and the result is likely to stir up heated debate. Dr Goal Saedi at Psychology Today touched on the subject of how intelligence is related to political ideology and provoked quite a strong response. The subject is a complex one and not yet fully understood. A review of the research literature reveals some conflicting findings, but one theme that seems to emerge is that the cultural context appears to influence the way that intelligence and political orientation are related to each other.

Psychologists have often been unkind to conservatives

A variety of theories have been proposed about the nature of the relationship between political views and intelligence. Some scholars (for example Stankov, 2009) have argued that conservative political ideologies tend to be associated with lower intelligence on average. Conservatives generally value tradition, respect for authority, and social order, and tend to be low in openness to experience, and so are leery of innovation and change. These scholars have argued that such values tend to be associated with cognitive rigidity and may therefore appeal to people who have difficulty with intellectual challenges that require them to process novel information. In support of this, Stankov (2009) cited evidence that people with more conservative views tend to score lower on IQ tests and to have lower levels of education. Not surprisingly, conservatives tend to react angrily to such assertions. Accusations of liberal bias among academics are often made and there does appear to be a degree of truth to these, especially among social psychologists in particular (e.g. Prentice, 2012).

An alternative theory, originally proposed by Hans Eysenck, is that higher intelligence is associated with avoidance of extreme political views in general. Hence, more intelligent people are thought to be moderate/centrist in their political views. The argument is that more extreme views, whether right-wing or left-wing, tend to be associated with dogmatism and rigidity, which are more appealing to less intelligent people. A recent proponent of this view is Rinderman who argued that more intelligent people tend to have civic values that lead them to support political systems they believe will foster education and the growth of knowledge (Rindermann, Flores-Mendoza, & Woodley, 2012). Hence, according to this view, intelligent people tend to believe that moderate/centrist parties are more likely to promote their particular social interests compared to more clearly left or right parties. In support of this, Rinderman et al. cite findings from Great Britain and Brazil showing that people who expressed support for centrist parties (including centre-right and centre-left) had higher average IQ’s compared to those who supported more clearly left or right parties. An interesting finding from the study in Brazil was that people who had a political orientation at all tended to have a higher IQ than those who said they had no political orientation. This suggests that people who are more intelligent tend to be more interested in and informed about politics generally. It is worth noting that the average IQ’s cited for the various political orientations in Rinderman et al.’s study were all well within the  normal range (an IQ ranging between 90 – 110 is considered “average”). For example, those who supported centre-right parties had the highest IQ (about 105) whereas those who supported clearly left or right parties had IQ’s around 94.  

Although Rinderman et al. found that more intelligent people tended to support more moderate views, an American study found the opposite effect. Kemmelmeier (2008) surveyed college students who scored above average in academic achievement tests (e.g. SAT and ACT) and found two trends. There was a linear trend for more intelligent students to be less conservative overall, in line with Stankov’s findings. Additionally, there was a non-linear trend[1] for the most intelligent students to support more extreme (i.e. left or right-wing) political views as opposed to more moderate ones, contrary to the findings of Rinderman et al. Political views in this study was measured by first asking people how liberal vs. conservative they were, and additionally asking about their views on more specific issues referred to as “traditional gender roles” and “anti-regulation” attitudes. Participants’ views on the former issues (e.g. gay marriage and abortion) were more strongly associated with their overall conservatism than their views on government regulation (e.g. gun control, higher taxes for the wealthy, speech codes on campus). Interestingly, higher intelligence was associated with less conservative views on traditional gender roles on the one hand, but more “conservative” views opposing government regulation. This suggests that more intelligent people in this study tended to support both greater personal freedom and less government regulation in general (libertarians take note). This finding is similar to that of a previous finding that higher education was associated with greater support for liberal social policies but not with support for greater economic regulation (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010).

The respective findings of Rinderman et al. and of Kemmelmeier would seem to contradict each other. The conflicting findings might possibly reflect differences between the samples. Participants in Rinderman’s study were predominantly of average intelligence, whereas those in Kemmelmeier’s study were students from elite colleges with high levels of intellectual ability. Perhaps, there is a complicated relationship with intelligence such that people of average ability tend to prefer moderate views, whereas those with greater intellectual gifts might perceive more extreme ideologies, whether left or right-wing, as more sophisticated and hence more appealing. Further research is needed to assess whether this is the case.

Another possibility is that the cultural context has an important impact on what political ideologies are most acceptable to intelligent people. The results of Rinderman et al.’s study might have been influenced by the fact that Brazilian people have had a long history of living through more extreme political regimes than in the USA. Hence, intelligent, sophisticated voters in Brazil might be more wary of extreme political parties than in the United States. Additionally, the ideologies that intelligent people support might be influenced by social norms. Woodley’s cultural mediation hypothesis proposes that that the highly intelligent are better at detecting and espousing the values that are normative at a particular time (Woodley, 2010). Hence, intellectuals might fluctuate in their support for left or right-wing views according to changing social norms. In support of this, Woodley notes a study of white South Africans in the 1980’s that found that higher cognitive ability was correlated with support for traditional conservative religious and political views, which were socially normative in that time and place. Woodley argues that since the 1960s, post-materialist values have become normative among intellectuals in much of the Western world. Hence apparent associations between left-liberal views and intelligence may reflect currently prevailing Western values.

The findings discussed illustrate a number of key points. Firstly, highly intelligent individuals may actually support right-wing views, not just left-wing ones, contrary to claims that support for right-wing positions reflects a lack of intellectual sophistication. It seems fair to say then that not only liberals, but conservatives (and those with other positions, such as libertarians) can have intellectually sophisticated reasons for their political views. The second point is that categorising people simply as generally liberal or conservative may mask differences in people’s views on social versus economic issues. The results of Kemmelmeier’s study suggest that when people are asked if they are liberal or conservative, they may give more weight to their views on social issues (such as abortion and gay rights) than to their views on economic issues (such as taxation). Therefore, in order to better understand how political attitudes are related to intelligence, a two-dimensional model that separates social and economic attitudes (see The World’s Smallest Political Quiz for one example) may be preferable to the traditional yet overly simplistic left/right distinction.

Finally, the relationship between intelligence and political attitudes is most likely not fixed in some simple way, but probably changes across time and context.



Footnote
[1] This could be visualised as like a U-shaped distribution of intelligence across the political spectrum. That is, there was a peak of intelligence on the left side, a dip in the middle, and a rise towards the right side. The left side tended to have more highly intelligent people than the right though, in line with the linear trend. 

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© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided. 

This article also appears on Psychology Today on my blog Unique - Like Everybody Else.

Image credit: EN2008 

Other articles discussing intelligence or the psychology of political orientation
Cold Winters and the Evolution of Intelligence - A critique of Richard Lynn’s Theory

References
Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts. American Political Science Review, 104(01), 111-133. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055410000031                   
            Kemmelmeier, M. (2008).  Is there a relationship between political orientation and cognitive ability? A test of three hypotheses in two studies. Personality and Individual Differences, 45 (8), 767-772 DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2008.08.003
Prentice, D. A. (2012). Liberal Norms and Their Discontents. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(5), 516-518. doi: 10.1177/1745691612454142





Sunday, September 2, 2012

Think like a man: could gender priming improve female recall of general knowledge?


ResearchBlogging.org As noted in a previous posting, a number of studies have found that males outperform females on tests of general knowledge. The reasons for this are not yet clear. Women’s poorer test performance could be because they actually have acquired less knowledge than men, or it could be that they are not accessing all the knowledge they have. Studies have found that experimental manipulations can actually improve a person’s performance on general knowledge tests to an extent. Women generally perform more poorly than men on spatial tasks, yet it has also been found that it is possible to experimentally improve women’s performance on these tasks so that they equal the performance of men. Whether or not it would be possible to improve women’s performance on tests of general knowledge relative to men has not yet been examined. Such a study would help illuminate whether gender differences in this area are due to real differences in acquired knowledge or mainly due to the nature of the testing situation.

Trivial pursuit questions have been used to experimentally test general knowledge

Sex differences in general knowledge favouring males that were identified in a number of studies have been attributed to differing interests between men and women rather than differences in ability (Lynn & Irwing, 2002; Lynn, Irwing, & Cammock, 2002). Another possibility that has not been explored in the research literature is that stereotype threat could have a detrimental effect on the performance of females in tests. Stereotypes are generally more favourable to men than women in intellectual domains. Men are generally perceived as more intelligent and rate themselves higher on intelligence than women (Ortner & Sieverding, 2008). Stereotypes can have a self-fulfilling effect and have been known to affect performance on achievement tests. For example, women who are reminded of their female identity perform more poorly on maths tests compared to a control group. However, priming of stereotypes can sometimes have a positive effect. Asian women primed with their Asian identity performed better than normally on a maths test.
"Oh no, not a test!!!"

Priming of stereotypes has also been found to affect performance on tests of general knowledge for better or worse (Dijksterhuis & van Knipperburg, 1998). People who were asked to think about a typical soccer hooligan (stereotypically associated with stupidity) and to list behaviours and attributes associated with such a person performed more poorly on a general knowledge test compared to those who took the test with no priming. This experimental procedure was also performed using a prime of a professor (associated with intelligence) rather than a soccer hooligan, and in this case, people actually performed better compared to those who received no priming. Obviously, thinking of professors cannot somehow make a person more knowledgeable than they really are. The authors of this study suggested that a person’s typical performance on such a test is less than optimal, meaning there is usually room for improvement. Priming of the professor stereotype might improve performance by leading to specific behavioural changes, such as increased concentration or more analytical and systematic thinking. The hooligan prime might worsen performance by inducing sloppier thinking or reduced concentration (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998).

Gender differences in spatial tasks are considered to be well-established, having been extensively investigated by researchers. However, there is evidence that priming of stereotypes can improve women’s performance on such tasks to a level equivalent to that of men (Ortner & Sieverding, 2008). The stereotype prime used was that of gender itself. Participants were asked to read a text that was described as “a task to test ability to put oneself in the shoes of another person.” The text consisted of a description of a day in the life of either a “typical woman” or a “typical man”. For example, the typical woman text described a woman who looked after children, spent time chatting with her friends, and who liked to daydream. The typical man text, described a man who drove a motorbike to work, was outgoing and tough-minded, bossed people around at work, and lifted weights in his spare time. Participants were then asked to describe what they would be like if they were that person, to develop a sense of identification with the person in the story. Subsequently, they performed a mental rotation task. After being primed with the story about a typical woman, female participants performed much worse than males. Males who received this prime performed only slightly worse than males who received the typical man prime. What was very striking though was that after receiving the typical man prime, females performed nearly as well as males on this task. The authors argued that these results imply that “normal” testing situations involve subtle stereotype threats, even when stereotypes are not explicitly mentioned. Gender differences in performance can therefore be reduced by changing the way the task is presented.

Experimental tests of general knowledge have so far not examined the effects of stereotypes on gender differences in performance. It is possible that asking people to perform a knowledge test activates a subtle stereotype threat that adversely affects women. Using an experimental priming procedure such as the one described above could enhance the performance of women relative to men on such tests. If this proved to be the case it would imply that women actually know more than they are letting on when they typically perform such tests. On the other hand, if a substantial gender difference remained after such a procedure it would provide evidence that males do tend to acquire more knowledge than females. Perhaps this might be due to a greater interest in understanding how things work, as opposed to a greater interest in interpersonal concerns, which is stereotypically more feminine. Additionally, it is also possible that gender differences in general knowledge are the result of a combination of reduced female performance due to stereotype threat and greater actual knowledge by males. Even if priming stereotypes had a modest effect on female performance compared to that of males, it could provide some guidance on how to assist people of both sexes in using their knowledge more effectively.  


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© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided. 


References

Dijksterhuis, A., & van Knippenberg, A. (1998). The relation between perception and behavior, or how to win a game of trivial pursuit.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74 (4), 865-877 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.4.865

Lynn, R., & Irwing, P. (2002). Sex differences in general knowledge, semantic memory and reasoning ability. British Journal of Psychology, 93(4), 545-556. doi: 10.1348/000712602761381394
Lynn, R., Irwing, P., & Cammock, T. (2002). Sex differences in general knowledge. Intelligence, 30(1), 27-39. doi: 10.1016/s0160-2896(01)00064-2
Ortner, T. M., & Sieverding, M. (2008). Where are the Gender Differences? Male Priming Boosts Spatial Skills in Women Sex Roles, 59 (3-4), 274-281 DOI: 10.1007/s11199-008-9448-9
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Friday, August 17, 2012

Reason versus faith? The interplay of intuition and rationality in supernatural belief


ResearchBlogging.org
Recent papers (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Shenhav,Rand, & Greene, 2011) have suggested that religious and paranormal beliefs are supported by “intuitive” thought processes and that engaging in “analytical” thought processes can weaken these beliefs, at least temporarily. These studies have fascinating implications for the development of non-rational beliefs and suggest possibilities for challenging such beliefs. These studies consider intuition and analytical thought as opposed systems, and while this is frequently applicable, previous research has found that in some people these two modes of thought co-exist to a high degree and their combination supports supernatural beliefs.

These studies are based on a “dual process” model of thought that proposes the existence of two parallel information processing modes. The first mode, sometimes called the experiential system, is intuitive, emotional and immediate. The second mode, sometimes called the rational system, is reflective, logical, and deliberative, and hence takes more time to process information than the intuitive system. There are individual differences in the degree to which people prefer to use either of these systems. Recent studies have found that people who show a greater inclination towards the use of intuitive thinking were more likely to endorse belief in God and the afterlife (Shenhav, et al., 2011) as well as in paranormal phenomena, including psychic powers, witchcraft, astrology and so on (Pennycook, et al., 2012). Pennycook et al. even classified belief in God along a spectrum from most conventional (a personal God exists), through the less conventional (belief in an impersonal higher power or an inactive God), and through into degrees of disbelief (agnosticism and atheism). They found that more conventional God beliefs were associated with more intuitive responses, whereas less conventional beliefs and disbelief were associated with more analytical responses.

Even more intriguing were the results of experimental interventions to manipulate intuitive versus analytical thinking. Belief in God was strengthened by a writing intervention designed to either increase confidence in one’s intuition or reduce confidence in one’s rationality (Shenhav, et al., 2011). Conversely, belief in God was weakened by decreasing confidence in intuition or increasing confidence in rationality. A series of experiments in which rationality was primed were also found to decrease belief in God (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). The primes used included viewing a picture of Rodin’s “Thinker”, reading words associated with analytical thinking (think, reason, analyze, ponder, rational), and, remarkably, reading a questionnaire in a difficult to read font. Previous research has found that information presented in a difficult to read font improves subsequent performance on tests of analytical thinking. Notably, none of these interventions involved any form of argumentation against religious belief or any mention of belief at all. People were simply asked to perform these tasks and then they answered questions about their beliefs.  


These findings have interesting implications for attempts at persuasion for or against religious beliefs. Encouraging people to trust their intuitions or gut feelings in matters unrelated to religion could increase a person’s subsequent receptivity to religious or supernatural ideas. Conversely, encouraging intellectual discussion or even having people read unrelated material in a hard-to-read font could elicit scepticism about such things. The studies cited could not address how durable these effects are likely to be, so it is possible that such interventions might have only transient effects.


The quote is attributed to Martin Luther, 1569.

 The findings of the studies do provide evidence that religious and supernatural beliefs are associated with intuitive thinking and that scepticism about religion is associated with analytical thinking. However, it would be premature to conclude that such beliefs are best viewed in terms of a dichotomy in which intuitive and analytical thinking are by nature opposed to each other. Such a dichotomy seems to be implied by statements by Pennycook et al. that: “initial intuitions during problem-solving often pre-empt further analysis” (p. 336) and “An analytic cognitive style will typically involve a broader assessment of problem elements as well as an examination and critical evaluation of intuitions.” The task used to assess preference for intuitive or analytical thinking actually involves asking people to solve problems where there is an intuitively appealing but incorrect answer, so that to reach the correct answer the person must reject their initial intuition. The nature of the task itself therefore sets up a dichotomy in which intuition and reflection are incompatible. This may well be applicable much of the time but there is some intriguing evidence that the two modes of thought sometimes operate in a parallel rather than a conflicting manner. This parallel operation has been found to have implications of its own for supernatural beliefs.

The dual-process model originally proposed that the two modes are independent of each other and as a result although some people habitually prefer one mode over the other, some people actually prefer to use both, while some people have little preference for either. One study sorted people into four clusters based on their respective preferences for the two modes of thought and examined their patterns of belief (Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff, & Mischo, 1999). The cluster who had high preferences for both intuitive and analytical thought (“complementary thinkers”) actually had the highest rates of paranormal belief of all four clusters and also scored higher on measures of magical thinking compared to the cluster with high analytical and low intuitive thinking (“rational thinkers”). Wolfradt et al. suggested that: “A simultaneous processing style leads potentially to a disinhibition of associations which fosters irrational thinking” (p. 828).

 The potentially complementary relationship between intuitive and analytical modes of thought seems to shed some light on religious beliefs among scientists. Scientists are vocationally committed to empiricism and therefore would be expected to be naturally high on analytical thinking. Scientists are generally expected to reject beliefs that are not based on evidence and surveys have found that the majority of scientists are not religious. However, there are a substantial minority of scientists who are religious (one study found as many as 40%) and this poses a question about why people who are committed to evidence-based propositions in their work would simultaneously accept faith-based beliefs in their private lives (MacPherson & Kelly, 2011). The MacPherson and Kelly study found that although scientists as a group were generally less religious than non-scientists, they also scored higher in creativity and magical thinking. Additionally, among these scientists, religious belief, creativity, and magical thinking were all positively correlated. This suggests that among scientists there is a subgroup that is religious, creative and accepting of unconventional views of reality. The authors suggested that religious and paranormal beliefs may be linked to creativity and that these may form part of a broader psychological dimension known as transliminality. Transliminality involves the crossing of psychological material into and out of awareness. People who are high in transliminality may feel more able to accommodate the apparent tension between rational and non-rational ideas. This notion seems similar to that of Wolfradt et al. who proposed that the “complementary” thinking style fosters loose associations that support magical thinking associated with paranormal beliefs.

Future research could examine what effects experimental manipulations of analytical thinking might have on complementary thinkers, such as religious scientists. It seems possible that in order to decrease the religious beliefs of a complementary thinker it would be necessary not only to strengthen their analytical thinking but to weaken their reliance on intuition. Such research might be of particular interest for example to those who are concerned about the increasing prominence of non-evidence based treatments such as alternative medicine in educational institutions.  


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© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided. 

  
References
          Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2012). Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief Science, 336 (6080), 493-496 DOI: 10.1126/science.1215647
MacPherson, J. S., & Kelly, S. W. (2011). Creativity and positive schizotypy influence the conflict between science and religion. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(4), 446-450. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2010.11.002
           Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012). Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief  Cognition, 123 (3), 335-346 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003
Shenhav, A., Rand, D., & Greene, J. (2011). Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God Journal of Experimental Psychology: General DOI: 10.1037/a0025391
Wolfradt, U., Oubaid, V., Straube, E. R., Bischoff, N., & Mischo, J. (1999). Thinking styles, schizotypal traits and anomalous experiences. Personality and Individual Differences, 27(5), 821-830. doi: 10.1016/s0191-8869(99)00031-8






Saturday, August 4, 2012

Problems with the Cold Winters theory of intelligence


There is continuing controversy about inter-ethnic differences in IQ and why these might exist. Richard Lynn (Kanazawa, 2012; Richard Lynn, 1987) proposed that Europeans and Asians are more intelligent than Africans because during their evolutionary history they faced the challenge of surviving in environments featuring extremely cold winters. He claimed that survival in cold conditions would have created selection pressures for greater intelligence. Africans on the other hand live in tropical conditions all year round and hence did not need as much intelligence. Lynn (2006) has presented data correlating the intelligence of different ethnic groups with the severity of their winter climates. However, there are some anomalies in his data and the theory itself is based on questionable assumptions.  

The theory of cold winters proposes that survival in colder climates poses two evolutionarily novel problems that would have required high intelligence to solve: finding food and keeping warm (Kanazawa, 2012). Kanazawa (2012) explains Lynn's theory with fairly sweeping statements about how easy it was to obtain food in Africa, whereas people in more northerly latitudes had to rely more extensively on hunting, which presumably required more intelligence. He cites a statement by Lynn “that hunting in the grasslands of Eurasia is more difficult than hunting in the woodlands of Africa because the former does not provide cover for the hunters.” This claim seems rather bizarre in light of the fact that modern humans are thought to have evolved on the African savannah, that is, open grasslands, and so African hunters would have therefore needed to solve the problem of hunting without tree cover. Kanazawa (2012) goes on to elaborate why Eurasian hunters were supposedly more sophisticated than their African counterparts:
Effective hunting thus presents a whole host of new adaptive problems for our ancestors in Eurasia to solve, including the coordination of different hunters for a single goal and the manufacture and use of hunting weapons. These problems were largely unencountered by their counterparts left behind in sub-Saharan Africa. These novel adaptive problems exerted strong selection pressures for higher intelligence.
   
Really? Does Kanazawa suppose that ancient African peoples did not know how to coordinate hunting parties or manufacture and use hunting weapons? Recent evidence indicates that humans have been hunting for at least two million years. Modern pygmies and Bushmen are known to hunt elephant and giraffe. Would not hunting these large animals pose adaptive problems involving coordination of hunting parties? Furthermore, some non-human carnivores, such as lions and wolves, hunt in coordinated packs with admirable efficiency. Although these animals are relatively intelligent I do not think anyone would seriously suppose that they require the intellectual capacities of humans to perform these feats.

Kanazawa argues that in cold climates producing fire is more difficult because there are fewer natural brush fires where fire can be obtained without making it. Also, in cold climates producing warm clothing and adequate shelter is more difficult. But what evidence is there that early humans needed a high level of intelligence to do these things? Neanderthals lived in Ice Age conditions for thousands of years and therefore faced these exact problems. Furthermore, Neanderthals were known to hunt European megafauna. Somehow they learned how to coordinate hunting parties to kill very large, very dangerous animals.  Does this mean they were more intelligent than the first modern humans living in Africa? I have never heard any scientist seriously propose that this is the case. The Neanderthal tool repertoire was much more limited than that of their Cro-Magnon contemporaries yet they somehow managed to survive for millennia with rather crude tools. Neanderthals do not seem to have developed any art forms, yet all races of modern humans, even the ones Lynn considers the least intelligent have developed art. Lynn (2006) acknowledges that anatomically modern humans first appeared in Africa. Yet he does not explain why it is that the modern human race that evolved in tropical Africa developed greater intelligence and cognitive sophistication compared to their Neanderthal relatives who had been surviving in harsh Ice Age conditions for so many millennia.
Were our Neanderthal cousins deep thinkers?

Lynn (2006) presents data on IQ, brain size, and winter temperatures for a wide range of human racial groups to support his theory that colder winters are associated with higher IQ and larger brains. However, he does note anomalies in the data. The peoples of the Arctic endure the harshest winter conditions of all. Lynn’s hypothesis would seem to predict that they would have the highest intelligence and the largest brain size of any race. Lynn’s review found that on average they did have larger brains than any other race. He has argued that generally speaking, average brain size is correlated with average IQ within a given human population. However, the median IQ of Arctic peoples according to Lynn’s data is 91. This is within the normal range but clearly not ‘superior’. Arctic people have been found to have unusually strong visual memory that exceeds that of Europeans. Europeans who have travelled with the Inuit have remarked upon their extraordinary ability to traverse apparently featureless terrain and closely observe the smallest landmarks and memorise their spatial locations. Lynn argued that this enhanced visual memory is a result of natural selection in their Arctic environment. Strong visual memory has also been noted among desert dwelling Australian Aboriginals, where it may have been an adaptation to life in a desert environment (Kearins, 1981). Lynn (2006, p. 144) argued that high intelligence requires large populations to develop because mutations, being chance events, are more likely to occur in large populations. Arctic people have smaller populations than Asians or Europeans and therefore mutations beneficial to intelligence did not occur. He argues that in Arctic peoples some of their larger brain size may be devoted specifically to visual memory. Strangely enough, he claims that Australian Aboriginals have smaller brain sizes compared to most other races, yet like Arctic peoples some Aboriginal tribes have apparently developed enhanced visual memory. To be fair, at least one study reported that Australian Aboriginals had a larger right visual cortex than Europeans, a part of the brain associated with spatial ability. He does not explain why natural selection among Arctic peoples would result in larger brain sizes or enhanced visual memory yet the same evolutionary pressures associated with a cold environment would not also produce higher intelligence. Arctic peoples have clear physical adaptations to the cold, such as short, stocky bodies well-suited to conserving heat. Additionally, some scientists have argued that a large brain is an adaptation to the cold that also helps to conserve heat. Neanderthals are striking for having had larger average brain sizes than modern humans, which has been argued to be an adaptation to the cold climate, yet they were clearly less cognitively sophisticated than modern humans. His argument about beneficial mutations occurring only in large populations seems like nothing more than special pleading. Furthermore, he acknowledges that some races, such as Pacific Islanders have smaller brains than Australian Aboriginals, yet they have higher average IQs (Table 16.2).

  When anatomically modern humans first appeared in tropical Africa, more primitive hominids, such as Homo erectus, had been living throughout Eurasia for over a million years. If cold winters were a stimulus to the development of greater intelligence it is not clear why modern humans developed such high intelligence in a tropical climate. Furthermore there is no compelling reason to suppose that survival in cold climates actually requires higher intelligence than survival in the tropics. It could be argued that survival in the tropics poses special challenges that would require intelligence, such as coping with tropical diseases and parasites. The explanation for why there are persisting inter-ethnic differences in mean IQ scores remains unclear (Neisser et al., 1996). Richard Lynn believes that these differences are due to evolved genetic differences between distinct racial groups but this view is not widely accepted in academia. His theory of cold winters as an explanation for this phenomenon does not seem at all plausible.


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© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided.  

References

Kanazawa, Satoshi (2012). The evolution of general intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 53 (2), 90-93 DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2011.05.015
Kearins, J. M. (1981). Visual spatial memory in Australian Aboriginal children of desert regions. Cognitive Psychology, 13(3), 434-460. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(81)90017-7
Lynn, R. (1987). The intelligence of the Mongoloids: A psychometric, evolutionary and neurological theory. Personality and Individual Differences, 8(6), 813-844. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(87)90135-8
Lynn, R. (2006). Race differences in intelligence: an evolutionary analysis: Washington Summit Publishers.
Neisser et al. (1996). Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns
 American Psychologist, 51 (2), 77-101 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.51.2.77



Friday, July 27, 2012

Assessing “emotional intelligence” will not help us understand psychopathy

Psychopathy is a well-known personality disorder characterised by callousness, shallow emotions, and willingness to manipulate other people for selfish ends (Hare, 1999). Emotional deficits seem to be a core feature of psychopathy. For example, there is evidence that psychopaths lack normal response differentiation to emotional and neutral words, and may have impaired recognition of emotional faces, although the evidence is not completely consistent (Ermer, Kahn, Salovey, & Kiehl, 2012). Some researchers have used tests of “emotional intelligence” (EI)  in order to better understand emotional deficits in psychopathy, with somewhat mixed results (Lishner, Swim, Hong, & Vitacco, 2011). I would argue that emotional intelligence tests are unlikely to reveal much of importance about emotional deficits in psychopathy because they lack validity and have little relevance to psychopathy.
Extravagant claims that emotional intelligence is a more important predictor of success in life than IQ have not been borne out by empirical research.

Perhaps the most prominent test of emotional intelligence today is the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), which purports to be an objective measure of one’s ability to perceive, understand, and manage emotions in self and others. The abilities it supposedly measures may be grouped into two areas: experiential EI (perceiving emotions and “facilitating thought”) and strategic EI (understanding and managing emotions). The perceiving emotions subtest is supposedly a strong indicator of empathic ability. Psychopaths are noted for their lack of empathic concern for others, yet a study of incarcerated men diagnosed with psychopathic traits found no correlation between experiential EI and psychopathy (Ermer, et al., 2012). The correlations between the perceiving emotion subscale and the psychopathy measures were all near zero. Psychopaths are supposed to be deficient in empathy yet they did not seem to be lacking ability to accurately perceive emotion in this study. This suggests either that the emotional perception measure is not a valid indicator of empathic ability or that in some sense psychopaths do not lack empathy. Perhaps psychopaths do perceive emotions accurately in others but the problem is that they are not moved by them. In other words, they know how others feel but simply do not care.
The same study did find rather small negative correlations between “strategic EI” and psychopathic traits, particularly in the “managing emotions” subtest. On its face, this might seem to suggest that psychopaths are not good at managing emotions in themselves or others. Or does it? According to psychopathy expert Robert Hare, psychopaths are highly motivated to manipulate others and are generally quick to get a read on people’s motivations and emotional vulnerabilities in order to exploit them (Hare, 1999). Some psychopathic individuals are noted for their use of superficial charm to successfully con other people into trusting them, suggesting that they do understand how to use people’s emotions, just not in a socially desirable manner. Social desirability might help explain why psychopaths apparently score badly on tests of managing emotions and what this really means.
The managing emotions subtest asks one to consider a scenario involving emotions in others and choose the “best” or “most effective” response (Ermer, et al., 2012). Scoring may be based on the general consensus method, which means that the “correct” response is the one that has been selected as best by the majority of people surveyed. There is also an “expert” scoring method, in which the correct response is the one most frequently endorsed by a panel of so-called “experts”. However, there is usually little difference between the two methods, suggesting that the experts agree with the majority of people. Hence, if you pick the answer that most people agree with you may be considered “emotionally intelligent”. This is in striking contrast to tests of general intelligence where highly intelligent people can produce answers that most people cannot (Brody, 2004).
In other words, the managing emotions subtest assesses endorsement of social norms. EI measures are designed to assess only socially acceptable uses of emotional information (Ermer, et al., 2012). Psychopaths on the other hand generally have little interest in following social norms, as psychopathic agendas such as conning and exploiting people are generally frowned upon. Therefore, their scores on emotional intelligence tests may reflect their lack of interest in following social norms rather than a lack of insight into what these norms are. The authors of another study on ability EI and psychopathy (Lishner, et al., 2011) acknowledged that participants had little incentive to produce the “correct” answers, so it was unclear whether the negative correlations they found between psychopathy and the managing emotions subtest reflected a real deficit or a lack of motivation to conform. EI tests have been criticised as a measure of conformity, so EI measures such as the MSCEIT may not be valid measures of ability because they assess conformity rather than competence. EI measures such as the managing emotions subtest assess knowledge, but do not assess actual skill in dealing with emotions (Brody, 2004). That is, a person may be aware of what they are supposed to do when dealing with an emotional person, but in practice they may or may not have the skill or ability to actually do it. Furthermore, whether a person uses their knowledge in daily life is not necessarily an issue of intelligence at all, as it may depend on habits, integrity and motivation (Locke, 2005).
Similarly in regard to psychopaths, the mere fact that they do not endorse the “correct” answers on EI tests does not mean they lack some form of “intelligence” required to understand emotions, because the test itself is not a measure of intelligence (Locke, 2005) but one of conformity to social norms. By definition, psychopaths disregard social norms, so the test does not seem to tell us anything we do not already know. Self-report measures of manipulation do exist, but it is not clear whether they measure actual ability to successfully manipulate other people’s emotions for personal gain (Ermer, et al., 2012). Understanding emotional deficits in psychopathy seems crucial to understanding this important and disturbing phenomenon but I would argue that the use of emotional intelligence tests is most likely a dead end because the measures are not valid and do not address the core emotional problems in the disorder. Psychopaths do seem to accurately perceive other people’s emotions but do not appear to have a normal emotional response themselves. Research focusing on why this is the case would seem to be a more productive avenue of enquiry.

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© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided. 

This article also appears on Psychology Today on my blog Unique - Like Everybody Else 

Other posts discussing intelligence related topics
Cold Winters and the Evolution of Intelligence: A critique of Richard Lynn’s Theory

The Illusory Theory of Multiple Intelligences – a critique of Howard Gardner’s theory

 References
Brody, N. (2004). What Cognitive Intelligence Is and What Emotional Intelligence Is Not. Psychological Inquiry, 15(3), 234-238.
Ermer, E., Kahn, R. E., Salovey, P., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). Emotional Intelligence in Incarcerated Men With Psychopathic Traits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology : 10.1037/a0027328
Hare, R. (1999). Without conscience: The disturbing world of psychopaths among us. New York: The Guilford Press.
Lishner, D. A., Swim, E. R., Hong, P. Y., & Vitacco, M. J. (2011). Psychopathy and ability emotional intelligence: Widespread or limited association among facets? Personality and Individual Differences, 50 (7), 1029-1033 DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2011.01.018
Locke, E. A. (2005). Why emotional intelligence is an invalid concept. Journal of Organizational Behavior. doi: 10.1002/job.318